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 
Abstract—Many studies link the recent collapse in trade 
during the 2008-09 financial crisis to a decrease in the demand 
for durable and investment goods in crisis-hit countries. Thus, a 
remarkable feature of the recent collapse in international trade 
is that China’s export sectors – for which the crisis-hit U.S. and 
Europe are the primary destinations – appear much less 
affected than their counterparts in other exporting countries. 
This paper explains the puzzle by documenting a new stylized 
fact: China’s processing exports fell much less than ordinary 
trade during the 2008-09 financial crisis, even conditioning on 
industry and demand in the destination country. It then 
investigates a range of explanations for the special behavior of 
processing trade. 
 
Index Terms—Trade collapse, processing trade, durables.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable feature of the recent 2008-2009 financial 
crisis is the collapse in international trade, which many 
studies link to a drop in the demand for durable and 
investment goods in crisis-hit countries. Economists believed 
that the economic downturn in the U.S. and Europe would 
affect China’s foreign trade dramatically, in particular 
Chinese exports. China is the largest source of imports for the 
U.S. (19.3 percent of total U.S. imports in 2009) and thus 
could have been particularly vulnerable to a drop in U.S. 
demand. Surprisingly, its export sectors escaped the worst of 
the fallout from financial crisis. Table I shows that while U.S. 
imports from the whole world declined 26 percent, the 
imports from China declined only by 13 percent. It is 
therefore a puzzle that China’s exports to countries at the 
origin of the financial crisis fell less than the exports to their 
other trading partners. While the broad facts are well known, 
we currently lack both a nuanced empirical understanding of 
the patterns and an economic explanation for the behavior of 
Chinese trade during this chaotic period. 
This paper is motivated by recent studies arguing that 
durable and investment goods play an important role in 
explaining the trade collapse following the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. Recent studies suggest that the collapse in 
trade during the crisis is mainly accounted for demand 
conditions in the destination countries [1]-[3]. Among 
international trade in goods, durable goods make up a large 
share of international trade which account for 70 percent on 
average for the OECD countries. In addition, durable goods 
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appear to be particularly volatile [4]. Therefore, these studies 
suggest that falling demand for durables is an important 
explanation for trade collapse during 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. To explain the remarkable performance of China’s 
exports during this period, I suggest that despite the 
disruption in the demand for durable and investment goods 
during the crisis, special characteristics in the organizational 
structure of China’s firms cushioned the impact of the 
fluctuations in demand on their exports and thus prevented 
the crisis from having as large an impact on China’s overall 
economy as for other countries. 
 
TABLE I: MERCHANDISE TRADE OF US BY ORIGIN, 2009 
 Value Share Growth 
Origin 2009 2000 2009 2008 2009 
China 310 8.5 19.3 5 -13 
EU (27) 288 18.7 17.9 4 -24 
Canada 228 18.5 14.2 7 -33 
Mexico 179 10.9 6.1 3 -18 
Japan 99 12 6.1 -4 -31 
Above 5 1102 68.6 68.7 - - 
 
This paper has two main parts. The first uses Chinese 
customs trade data to document the patterns of China’s 
exports during the financial crisis. In particular, I focus on the 
behavior of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), durables, 
and processing trade during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
The second part uses an alternative way of decomposing 
changes in China’s trade and focuses on the degree to which 
changes occur via what has become known as the extensive 
versus intensive margin. The main findings in the first part 
can be summarized as follows. First, processing trade fell 
much less than ordinary trade in terms of export volume, 
even conditioning on industry and demand in the destination 
country. In general, processing exports are less sensitive than 
non-processing exports to destination country demand, 
consistent with findings of Manova and Yu [5]. This study 
goes beyond by showing that processing exports became 
significantly less sensitive to destination country GDP during 
the crisis, implying a surprising counter-cyclical relationship 
between the macroeconomic shocks and processing trade. 
Second, though there is a significant drop in exports by both 
FIEs and domestically owned firms, domestically owned 
firms perform better than FIEs in terms of exports of durables. 
In general, exports by FIEs are more sensitive than 
domestically owned firms to destination country demand, but 
became less sensitive during the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis—the first clue regarding the importance of firms’ 
organizational structure in weathering the shock. Third, 
while exports of durables during the crisis decline more than 
The China Puzzle: Theory and Evidence on the 
Behavior of Chinese Exports during the 2008-2009 
Global Financial Crisis  
Hang-Wei Hao 
Journal of Economics, Business and Management, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 2016
546doi: 10.18178/joebm.2016.4.10.450
  
exports of non-durables, in line with findings by Levchenko 
et al. [6], interestingly, exports of durables from China had 
differing sensitivity to destination country demand 
conditions during the crisis depending on the organizational 
structure of the firm beyond just foreign ownership. 
Processing exports of durables became much less sensitive, 
while non-processing exports of durables became more 
sensitive to destination countries’ GDP during the crisis. 
These three findings suggest that demand-driven 
explanations for the collapse in trade may not capture the 
whole picture in China’s export behavior during the 
2008-2009 crisis. 
I also examine the behavior of Chinese exporters during 
the crisis by breaking down export growth into the intensive 
and extensive margins, as presented in section IV. In this part 
of exercise, we established two results: (1) variation in trade 
across time is dominated by the intensive margin and (2) 
recent crisis appears to have compelled producers to rush 
from the ordinary trade markets toward processing trade 
markets. Analysis of the extensive and intensive margins 
increases understanding of trade patterns and the relative 
efficiency with which economies allocate resources. A large 
and growing body of theoretical and empirical work in 
international trade suggests that trade liberalization raises 
aggregate productivity via the extensive margin: as trade 
costs fall, the least productive firms exit, while the most 
productive firms expand, and, within surviving firms, the 
least productive products are dropped [7]-[9]. I also show 
that the role of the intensive margin in total export growth 
increases substantially during the crisis. In particular, the 
intensive margin among FIEs and processing trade are more 
influential in explaining variation in trade during the 
financial crisis than the extensive margin. This large 
(negative) growth rate in the intensive margin is also 
supportive of predictions consistent with traditional theories 
advocating an important role for terms of trade effects [10]. 
By examining the changes in trade that take place within 
existing trade relationship (intensive margins) and the 
changes in trade due to entry and exit (extensive margins), 
such as a new exporter entering the export market, or an 
existing exporter narrowing the range of its export product or 
destination countries, I find that during the crisis the drop in 
the intensive margin of processing exports accounted for 41 
percent of the drop in total exports, with a net increase in new 
exporters entering the processing export market. These 
findings imply the possibilities that the existing processing 
exporters are reluctant to exit their existing markets due to the 
sunk entry cost while there are some hybrid exporters that 
engage in both ordinary and processing export might escape 
from ordinary exports to processing exports. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
summarizes the literature on the recent trade collapse. 
Section III describes the data and categorization of durable 
and non-durable goods and presents a set of stylized facts on 
the recent trade collapse using detailed yearly data from 
China’s custom database. I also examine the behavior of 
Chinese exporters during the crisis by breaking down export 
growth into the intensive and extensive margins. Section IV 
uses detailed data to assess whether the variation is consistent 
with the main explanations proposed in the policy literature 
and performs robustness checks. Section V concludes. 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper is part of a growing literature on the features of 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis in general, and on the China’s 
extraordinary trade performance in during the crisis. The 
literature is divided as to whether finance or destination 
country demand is the major factor influencing the collapse 
in world trade during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Some 
literature assesses whether particular channels, such as 
inventory adjustment, demand for durables or manufactures, 
and trade frictions, respectively, can account for the trade 
collapse in quantitative models [2], [11]-[12]. Some analyze 
the crisis experience in a large sample of emerging market 
countries to establish which country characteristics can best 
explain the cross-sectional variation in the severity of 
downturns [13]. 
One thing that the literature agrees on is that a key part of 
the explanation for why trade contracted by proportionally 
more than GDP or tradable sector output is the composition 
of demand: international trade is concentrated in sectors in 
which demand fell the most [6], [12]. An important facet of 
this explanation is the distinction between durables and 
nondurables [14]. However, it is not clear whether the 
sensitivity of durables during the crisis was due to its links 
with private demand or with credit constraints involving 
purchasing and trade finance. Some argue that credit 
conditions were important channel through which the crisis 
affected trade volumes, by exploiting the variation in the cost 
of capital across countries and over time, as well as the 
variation in financial vulnerability across sectors [15], [16]. 
Whereas, financial openness appears to have made limited 
difference in explaining the cause of trade collapse [17]. 
Regarding the remarkable performances of China’s trade 
during crisis, some hypothesize that the much greater fall in 
international trade compared to aggregate consumption is 
due to agents reducing the quality of the goods they consume 
in response to the adverse income shock. However, there is 
little evidence showing that US imports of higher-quality 
goods fell by a large amount than did lower-quality goods 
during the financial crisis [18]. 
I analyze the behavior of durable goods exports across 
destinations by firm type, demonstrating that private demand 
is not the only factor involved. The special characteristics of 
processing trade and FIEs may explain China’s extraordinary 
performance during crisis. First, the literature has unveiled 
some systematic patterns in China’s processing trade: 1) 
China’s processing exports to East Asian countries are more 
sensitive to export distance than its processing exports to 
non-Asian countries; 2) multinational firms generally use 
China as an export-processing platform because it is not only 
located close to East Asian input suppliers but it is in the 
vicinity of large East Asian Market; 3) China’s heavy 
reliance on imported inputs from within the East Asian 
region enables China to transfer a large portion of its negative 
demand shocks to its East Asian neighbors by reducing its 
demand for their processing imports; 4) products with high 
share of processing trade prior to the 2008-2009 crisis are hit 
by the recession earlier than other products. In addition, 
products with high share of processing trade are found to be 
more likely to fall during the downturn but also closely 
following the recovery of foreign production and first enjoy 
the strong recovering momentum [19]-[21]. 
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III. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS 
Data from the Customs General Administration of the 
People’s Republic of China show processing imports and 
exports by year (2000-2009), the 8-digit harmonized system 
(HS) includes 8,900 product codes, origin or destination 
city-districts in China (including trade zone status), 
destination country (230 countries in the sample), customs 
regime (ordinary, pure-assembly processing trade, and 
import-and-assembly processing trade), and ownership 
type(foreign-invested or Chinese-owned). Our data, while 
not at the firm level, are still highly disaggregated. In the 
following regressions, I observe exports by year, sectors, 
type of economic zone, product, and destination market, 
yielding approximately 20,000 observations per year. For the 
vast majority of these 
year-industry-zone-product-destination country cells, I then 
conduct the regression analyses. Table II reports Chinese 
export structure from 2008 to 2009. In Table II, I found that 
during the crisis processing export declined by 13 percent 
whereas ordinary export declined by 20 percent. In addition, 
durable goods exported via processing trade dropped by 12 
percent compared to those via ordinary trade dropped by 26 
percent. These evidence gave us a clue that processing 
exports may play an important role to survive the crisis. 
 
TABLE II: THE ARRANGEMENT OF CHANNELS 
 
Table III reports a breakdown of China’s exports into 
processing trade and ordinary trade according to exporter’s 
customs declarations, showing that China’s processing and 
ordinary exports to the world decreased by 13 percent and 20 
percent, respectively. Panel A of Table III reports the 
reduction in processing and ordinary exports by sector for the 
recent financial crisis. The processing exports show a similar 
pattern for total exports, whereas the ordinary exports suffer a 
double-digit percentage reductions (with metals and articles 
and miscellaneous manufacturing as the exceptions at -8.27 
percent and -8.13 percent). Panel B of Table III breaks 
processing and ordinary exports into durables and 
non-durables. For ordinary exports, durable goods are more 
sensitive than non-durable goods (-26 percent versus -8 
percent) during the financial crisis. Interestingly, durable 
goods within processing exports were less sensitive than 
non-durables. Since processing durables exports account for 
40 percent of China’s total exports, this is the first clue that 
firm’s organizational structure may explain China’s 
exceptional performance during financial crisis. Panel C of 
Table III shows that China’s processing and ordinary exports 
to its main trade partners. Generally speaking, processing 
exports to major trade partners were less sensitive to 
fluctuation in demand than ordinary exports. 
 
TABLE III: DISAGGREGATED EXPORTS FLOWS, NOMINAL  
 Processing Ordinary 
 Share 
Growth 
(%) 
Share Growth (%) 
Total     
 Panel A: By Sector 
Animal & Food 0.01 -4.54 0.01 -17.11 
Mineral & Wood 0.02 -3.81 0.12 -16.24 
Chemicals & Plastics 0.02 -21.03 0.19 -13.21 
Textiles 0.03 -14.53 0.08 -18.27 
Footware & Headgear 0.01 -11.66 0.00 - 
Metals & Articles 0.01 -25.95 0.12 -8.27 
Machinery & Electrical 0.32 -12.57 0.40 -12.82 
Transportation 0.03 -1.32 0.07 -10.33 
Misc. Manufacturing 0.05 -17.97 0.01 -8.13 
 Panel B: By Durability 
Durables 0.40 -12.42 0.23 -26.34 
Non-durables 0.08 -17.65 0.20 -8.20 
 Panel C: By Destination 
North America 0.10 -11.05 0.07 -17.12 
US 0.10 -10.93 0.07 -16.41 
Canada 0.01 -12.74 0.01 -22.74 
EU(27) 0.09 -17.57 0.09 -22.01 
Germany 0.02 -19.71 0.02 -12.06 
United Kingdom 0.01 -11.97 0.01 -11.32 
Netherlands 0.02 -16.54 0.01 -25.10 
Asia 0.24 -12.44 0.24 -33.50 
Japan 0.03 -13.97 0.03 -18.74 
South Korea 0.02 -9.18 0.02 -42.89 
Taiwan 0.01 -12.83 0.01 -29.59 
India 0.01 -14.02 0.02 -11.38 
Singapore 0.01 5.74 0.01 -25.32 
HK 0.14 -14.47 0.03 -10.89 
Australia 0.01 -2.28 0.01 -11.4 
 
IV. ANALYSES 
A. Specification and Key Variables 
I run regressions using an industry-level panel database. I 
regress Chinese export growth of different identifier on 
destination country GDP growth and the interaction terms of 
destination country GDP growth and trade characteristic 
variables and controlling for other fixed effects. I also 
examine whether different trade characteristic associated 
with export performance during financial crises. The 
econometric specification is given by the following equation: 
 
  kjFIEDURPROCkj
ZZ
Z
XZ
XY
ittsfdc
kj
kjn
m
l










 and ,,,
10





   (1) 
 
where Y is export growth of different identifiers categorized 
by customs regime(c), country destination(d), firm type(f), 
and industry(s), and year(t); X is destination country GDP 
growth with different destinations d; Z is trade characteristics 
with different identifier; Other regressors and the sources of 
the data are explained in Table IV. Robust standard errors are 
reported. 
 2008 2009 Growth 
 Value Share Value Share (%) 
Durable 976 .68 811.2 .68 -17 
Non-Durable 450.6 .32 388.7 .32 -14 
FIEs 789.5 .55 671.1 .56 -15 
Non-FIEs 637.1 .45 528.9 .44 -17 
Processing 675.1 .47 586.9 .49 -13 
Ordinary 660.8 .46 528.1 .44 -20 
Processing Durable 553.5 .39 484.7 .40 -12 
Ordinary Durable 373.8 .26 275.4 .23 -26 
FIEs Durable 618.8 .43 522.6 .44 -16 
Non-FIEs Durable 336.8 .24 266.6 .22 -21 
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TABLE IV: DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES 
 
 Regression results are reported in Table V. In the first 
column, the result that regresses ∆Export on ∆GDP and 
∆GDP interacted with PROC, DUR and FIE dummies. The 
coefficient on ∆GDP is positive and significant, implying 
that one percent change in GDP is associated with 0.407 
percent change in export growth rate. The coefficient on 
∆GDP× PROC is negative and significant, implying that 
processing export is less sensitive to destination country 
demand. Both coefficients on ∆GDP×FIE and ∆GDP×DUR 
are positive and significant, implying that both exports by 
FIEs and durables exports are more sensitive to destination 
country demand. 
I then examine the sensitivity of processing exports, 
exports of durable goods, and exports by FIEs during the 
crisis by the following specification, 
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where the Z stands for either PROC, FIE, or DUR dummies, 
and the CRISIS dummy equals 1 if the observation is in 2009 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
TABLE V: RANDOM EFFECTS ESTIMATES FOR SENSITIVITY OF VARIOUS 
TYPE OF CHINESE EXPORT (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ∆EXP) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. For each of the specifications listed, 
we have controlled for industry, destination country, customs regime, firm 
type, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the 
parenthesis. 
 
In column 2 of Table V, the coefficient on 
∆GDP×PROC×CRISIS is negative and significant, implying 
that processing exports are less sensitive to destination 
country demand during the crisis. In column 3 of Table V, the 
coefficient on ∆GDP×FIE×CRISIS is negative and 
significant, implying that exports by FIEs became less 
sensitive to destination country demand during the crisis. In 
column 4 of Table V, the coefficient on 
∆GDP×DUR×CRISIS is positive but insignificant, implying 
that durable goods exports became more sensitive to 
destination country demand during the crisis. It is interesting 
that processing export growth rate became less sensitive and 
durables exports had no significant reaction to destination 
country demand shocks in China, since previous literature 
suggests that the drop in demand for durables is an important 
feature of the trade collapse during 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Column 5 of Table V is a robustness check of the 
specification by pooling all the variables. The coefficient on 
∆GDP×PROC×CRISIS is still negative and significant, the 
coefficient on ∆GDP×FIE×CRISIS is still negative but 
insignificant as well as the coefficient on 
∆GDP×DUR×CRISIS. The regression results suggest that 
firm organizational structure may help to explain China’s 
relatively small drop in exports during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. Thus, I conduct some tests to see if this 
surprising result that can be explained by FIE participation or 
by processing trade. 
B. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
First, I decompose the data into two subsets: FIEs and 
domestically owned firms. Using the specification (2), I find 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
∆EXP 
One period ln(Export) differences toward different 
identifier i which is categorized by industry, country 
destination, firm type, and customs regime. 
Independent Variable 
∆GDP 
One period ln(GDP) difference for different country 
destination d. 
PROC 
Processing export dummy that equals one if the firm is 
engaging processing trade and zero otherwise. 
DUR 
Durable goods dummy that equals one if the product 
being exported is durable goods and zero otherwise. 
FIE 
FIEs export dummy that equals one if the firm is a 
foreign-invested enterprise and zero otherwise. 
CRISIS 
Crisis dummy that equals one if the product was being 
exported in 2009 and zero otherwise. 
PURE 
Pure assembly processing export dummy that equals one 
if the firm is engaging pure-assembly processing trade 
and zero otherwise. 
IMP 
Import-and-assembly processing export dummy that 
equals one if the firm is engaging import-and-assembly 
processing trade and zero otherwise. 
Control Variable 
YEAR Control for the year from 2000 to 2009. 
INDUS Categorical variable for 9 different sectors 
CTYOD Control for 230 destination countries 
FTYPE Control for different ownership type 
CREGIME Control for different customs regime 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆GDP 
0.407 0.32 0.357 0.393 0.299 
(0.058)*** (0.066)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.071)*** 
PROC 
-0.134 -0.161 -0.135 -0.135 -0.16 
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
FIE 
0.114 0.114 0.104 0.114 0.107 
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** 
DUR 
-0.033 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.033 
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
FIE×DUR 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
PROC×DUR 
-0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
(0.011)* (0.011)* (0.011)* (0.011)* (0.011)* 
PROC×FIE 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
∆GDP×PROC 
-0.195 0 -0.195 -0.194 -0.008 
(0.058)*** (0.07) (0.058)*** (0.058)*** (0.07) 
∆GDP×FIE 0.337 0.337 0.414 0.338 0.389 
(0.058)*** (0.058)*** (0.07)*** (0.058)*** (0.07)*** 
∆GDP×DUR 0.403 0.401 0.404 0.398 0.404 
(0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.068)*** (0.068)*** 
∆GDP×CRISI
S 
 0.322 0.19 0.052 0.405 
 (0.127)** (0.129) (0.136) (0.166)** 
∆GDP×PROC
×CRISIS 
 -0.821   -0.791 
 (0.174)***   (0.177)*** 
∆GDP×FIE× 
CRISIS 
  -0.314  -0.214 
  (0.177)*  (0.18) 
∆GDP×DUR×
CRISIS 
   0.023 -0.012 
   (0.173) (0.173) 
Constant 
0.032 0.04 0.035 0.03 0.043 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Observations 201,929 201,929 201,929 201,929 201,929 
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that both groups reveal a negative sign and significant 
coefficient for ∆GDP×PROC×CRISIS, suggesting that 
processing exports by both FIEs and non-FIEs became less 
sensitive during the crisis. Second, I decompose the data into 
two subsets: durable and non-durable. Then again using 
specification (2), I find that both groups reveal a negative 
sign and significant coefficient for ∆GDP×PROC×CRISIS. 
The result suggests that both processing exports of durables 
and non-durables became less sensitive to destination market 
demand during the crisis. Note that the magnitude of 
sensitivity of processing exports by Non-FIEs and processing 
exports of non-durables are relatively small compared to 
processing exports by FIEs and processing exports of 
durables, respectively (see Table VI). 
 
TABLE VI: RANDOM EFFECTS ESTIMATES FOR SENSITIVITY OF PROCESSING 
EXPORT (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ∆EXP)  
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. For each of the specifications listed, I 
have controlled for industry, destination country, customs regime, firm type, 
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
Finally, to examine the behavior of processing durable 
exports during the crisis, we decompose processing trade into 
two different regimes: 
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where P stands for either pure assembler or imported 
assembler dummies, and the dummy CRISIS is the crisis 
dummy equal to 1 if the observation is in 2009 and zero 
otherwise. All processing plants (whether Chinese or foreign 
owned) operate according to one of two [24] – a 
pure-assembly regime, in which a foreign buyer supplies a 
plant in China with inputs and hires the plant to process them 
into finished goods, all the while retaining ownership over 
the inputs, or an import-and-assembly regime, in which a 
plant in China imports inputs of its own accord, processes 
them, and sells the processed goods to a foreign buyer. 
Column 1 of Table VII shows that (1) pure assemblers were 
less sensitive than import assemblers and (2) durable exports 
by pure  
assemblers are more sensitive than durable exports by 
importing assemblers (in absolute value). In column 2 of 
Table VII, durable exports by both pure assemblers and 
imported assembler are even less sensitive to destination 
country demand during the crisis. In column 3 of Table VII, 
processing exports by both pure assemblers and imported 
assembler became even less sensitive to destination country 
demand during the crisis. 
 
TABLE VI: RANDOM EFFECTS ESTIMATES FOR SENSITIVITY OF VARIOUS 
TYPE OF PROCESSING EXPORT (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ∆EXP) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. For each of the specifications listed, I 
have controlled for industry, destination country, customs regime, firm type, 
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
C. Intensive vs. Extensive Margins 
Another way to characterize the trade pattern during the 
financial crisis is to assess changes in the intensive margin 
and the extensive margin of exports, namely changes in the 
value of goods that are already imported and exported, and 
changes in the number of goods imported and exported. More 
specifically, the “intensive” margin refers to changes in trade 
that take place within surviving trade relationships, e.g., the 
same firm exporting more or less of the same product to the 
same country. The “extensive” margin, by contrast, tracks 
changes in trade due to entry and exit, such as a new firm 
entering the export market, or an existing firm narrowing the 
Variable 
FIE Non-FIE Durable Non-durabl
e 
∆GDP 
0.568 0.395 0.61 0.443 
(0.097)*** (0.082)*** (0.083)*** (0.085)*** 
PROC 
-0.146 -0.116 -0.18 -0.179 
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)*** 
FIE 
0.468 - 0.148 0.1 
(0.172)***  - (0.018)*** 
DUR 
-0.041 -0.005  0.056 
(0.019)** (0.016) (0.106) - 
PROC×DUR 
-0.024 -0.031  - 
(0.017) (0.015)** - - 
PROC×FIE 
- - 0.073 0.07 
-  - (0.017)*** 
∆GDP×PROC 
-0.061 0.053 -0.068 0.077 
(0.103) (0.096) (0.100) (0.097) 
∆GDP×FIE - - 0.424 0.242 
- - (0.084)*** (0.080)*** 
∆GDP×DUR 0.505 0.32   
(0.087)*** (0.074)***   
∆GDP×CRISIS 0.507 0.204 0.323 0.326 
(0.213)** (0.159) (0.178)* (0.181)* 
∆GDP×PROC×CRISI
S 
-1.075 -0.589 -0.635 -1.028 
(0.260)*** (0.239)** (0.255)** (0.236)*** 
Constant 
- -0.105 - -0.047 
- (0.092) - (0.134) 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Observations 85,972 115,957 103,014 98,915 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
∆GDP 
0.531 0.531 0.529 
(0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.059)*** 
PURE 
-0.134 -0.134 -0.156 
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** 
IMP 
-0.132 -0.132 -0.148 
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
DUR 
-0.028 -0.028 -0.027 
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
IMP×DUR 
0.015 0.001 0.015 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
PURE×DUR 
-0.066 -0.073 -0.064 
(0.024)*** (0.027)*** (0.024)*** 
∆GDP×PURE 
-0.258 -0.257 -0.092 
(0.114)** (0.114)** (0.131) 
∆GDP×IMP 
-0.059 -0.058 0.058 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.094) 
∆GDP×DUR 
0.406 0.406 0.405 
(0.074)*** (0.074)*** (0.074)*** 
∆GDP×PURE×DUR -0.175 -0.121 -0.191 
(0.185) (0.204) (0.184) 
∆GDP×IMP×DUR 
0.004 0.103 0.001 
(0.124) (0.134) (0.123) 
∆GDP×PURE×DUR 
×CRISIS 
 -0.254  
 (0.454)  
∆GDP×IMP×DUR 
×CRISIS 
 -0.452  
 (0.226)**  
∆GDP×PURE×CRISIS 
  -0.689 
  (0.262)*** 
∆GDP×IMP×CRISIS 
  -0.505 
  (0.161)*** 
Constant 
0.005 0.009 0.015 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Observations 201,929 201,929 201,929 
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range of its export products or destination countries. While 
this approach is most straightforward using a firm level 
dataset, the fundamental observation available to us is the 
8-digit HS product, Chinese city-district, and destination 
market. For example, if there is a single factory processing 
“men’s or boy’s suit-type jackets of wool” in city of 
Shenzhen, in Guangdong Province, operating in a SEZ, and 
exporting goods directly to the U.S., then the Chinese data 
would show its ownership and control regime along with its 
export value. However, if there are several such processing 
factories in Shenzhen (located in the same economic zone 
and exporting the same product directly to the U.S.), then the 
exports of each ownership and control regime represented 
there would be listed. Thus, we would expect somewhat 
upward biased intensive margin and downward biased 
extensive margin. 
Table VIII reports the volume of extensive margins and 
intensive margin changes as well as their share of the total 
export growth in parenthesis. I observe that variation in trade 
across time is dominated by the intensive margin in China 
with an exception in 2001 [25], [26]. As indicated in the first 
column of each panel, the intensive margin accounts for the 
largest share of annual export growth from 2002-2009. 
Across 2001 to 2009, it averages 63.6 percent for exports. It 
is noteworthy that the share of the intensive margin in total 
export growth attained its peak during the financial crisis (it 
accounts for 84 percent of annual export growth). In addition, 
the intensive margin is more influential in explaining 
variation in exports by FIEs. Across 2001 to 2009, the share 
of intensive margins in total export growth for FIEs averages 
39.67 percent while the share of extensive margins of FIEs 
averages 20.22 percent [26]. FIE and non-FIE exports differ 
most in terms of the reaction on the intensive margin (24 
percent versus -2 percent, respectively). 
 
TABLE VI: INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE MARGIN, NOMINAL 
Note: Share of total exports growth in parentheses 
 
 
Fig. 1. Intensive margin. 
 
Similarly, the intensive margin is more dominant in 
explaining processing export fluctuations during the 
financial crisis. The share of the intensive margin in 
processing trade fluctuations jumped from 13 percent in 2008 
to 41 percent in 2009 and only 2 percent of export growth in 
2009 is explained by the extensive margin of processing trade. 
As for the share of the intensive margin and extensive margin 
in ordinary trade, it is relatively stable. Though the intensive 
margin is the dominant explanation for the variation in 
ordinary trade, it did not change substantially during the 
financial crisis (see Fig. 1 and 2). Combined with the 
increased role of the intensive margin above and the fact that 
ordinary trade became more sensitive to destination market 
demand during the crisis, this suggests that more firms were 
engaging in processing trade during the crisis, perhaps to deal 
with increased in arms-length trading relationships as 
demand became more volatile. 
 
Fig. 2. Extensive margin. 
 Intensive Margin Extensive Margin 
Year All FIEs Non-FIEs Processing Ordinary All FIEs Non-FIEs Processing Ordinary 
2001 7.47 7.04 0.42 5.42 2.41 9.57 6.69 2.88 4.32 4.35 
 (0.44) (0.41) (0.02) (0.32) (0.14) (0.56) (0.39) (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) 
2002 33.5 20.83 12.67 18.91 13.01 25.79 15.91 9.88 13.64 11.25 
 (0.56) (0.35) (0.21) (0.32) (0.22) (0.44) (0.27) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) 
2003 77.95 51.89 26.06 47.18 28.46 34.86 18.51 16.34 14.73 17.37 
 (0.69) (0.46) (0.23) (0.42) (0.25) (0.31) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
2004 107.79 73.75 34.05 64.67 39.11 47.21 24.52 22.68 21.47 22.49 
 (0.70) (0.48) (0.22) (0.42) (0.25) (0.30) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
2005 109.76 75.13 34.63 62.34 42.2 58.87 30.47 28.4 26.15 29.25 
 (0.65) (0.45) (0.21) (0.37) (0.25) (0.35) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
2006 136.15 85.56 50.59 67.86 62.22 70.93 34.06 36.87 26.03 39.01 
 (0.66) (0.41) (0.24) (0.33) (0.30) (0.34) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) 
2007 140.52 71.73 68.79 60.43 70.73 108.34 59.93 48.42 46.79 51.52 
 (0.56) (0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.28) (0.44) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) 
2008 131.37 51.02 80.35 26.94 85.67 79.18 44.09 35.09 30.64 38.31 
 (0.62) (0.24) (0.38) (0.13) (0.41) (0.38) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) 
2009 -191.32 -109.15 -82.17 -93.27 -90.52 -37.18 -10.36 -26.82 5.00 -43.80 
 (0.84) (0.48) (0.36) (0.41) (0.40) (0.16) (0.05) (0.12) (-0.02) (0.19) 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
In the first exercise, I examine the sensitivity of various 
type of exports in China both the general pattern and 
particularly during the crisis. In general, processing exports 
are less sensitive than non-processing exports to destination 
country demand. Exports by FIEs and durable exports are 
more sensitive to destination country demand. However, 
when I further examine the sensitivities of these type of 
exports, it ended up with some unexpected results. Both 
durable exports and exports by FIEs became more sensitive 
during the crisis. In contrast, I find that processing exports 
became less sensitive during the crisis which shed light on 
China’s remarkable performance during the crisis. While 
non-processing exports of durables did not seem to become 
much more sensitive (very small increase), processing 
exports of durables became considerably less sensitive 
during the crisis. In addition, I show that the role of the 
intensive margin in the total export growth increases 
substantially during the crisis. In particular, the intensive 
margin among FIEs and processing trade are more influential 
in explaining variation in trade during the financial crisis than 
the extensive margin. This large growth in the intensive 
margin is also supportive of predications consistent with 
traditional theories with an important role for terms of trade 
effects [10]. These exercises contribute to the crisis literature 
on several dimensions. First, I show that processing exports 
are in general relatively stable, while destination countries 
suffer demand shocks processing exports may be more 
resistant to the shocks. Second, multinational firms are in 
general responsive to destination country demand. This may 
be due to both financial and production linkages of 
multinational subsidiaries and parent firms make 
multinational firms not only have more access to resources 
and additional funding but less likely to resist ”global” 
financial crisis. Third, though recent literature claims that 
durable exports play an important role in explaining the trade 
collapse during 2008-2009 financial crisis, these results 
suggest that durable exports from emerging countries may 
have ambiguous response to the demand shocks. 
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